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I. Introduction
In the important decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in AIB Group (UK) v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors1 (“AIB”), Lord 
Toulson observed that “[t]he debate [that] has followed Target Holdings 
Ltd v Redferns2 (“Target”) is part of a wider debate, or series of debates, 
about equitable doctrines and remedies and their inter-relationship 
with common law principles and remedies, particularly in a commercial 
context”.3 As regards compensatory remedies for breach of trust, the scope 
of the debate has effectively been narrowed — at least in England and 
Wales — by the decision in AIB: nothing is to be gained by falsifying and 
surcharging the account, which is the traditional approach in equity, and 
the court can simply award compensation for loss caused by the trustee’s 
1. [2014] UKSC 58 [AIB].
2. [1996] AC 421 (Eng) [Target].
3. AIB, supra note 1 at para 47.
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breach of duty.4 Lord Toulson thought that “in circumstances such as 
those in Target, the extent of equitable compensation should be the same 
as if damages for breach of contract were sought at common law”.5 In a 
similar vein, in Thanakharn Kasikhorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) v Akai 
Holdings Ltd (in liquidation)6 (“Akai”), Lord Neuberger, sitting as a non-
permanent judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, commented 
that: 
even if the principles … had suggested that Akai was entitled to equitable 
compensation in an amount greater than it should recover by way of common 
law damages, I would have been very sympathetic to the notion that the 
equitable remedy would have to be refashioned so as to equate the amount of 
such compensation with the common law damages.7 
This suggests that the common law rules may have some impact upon the 
principles of equitable compensation.
The decision in AIB accelerates the need to establish clear principles 
that can be employed when awarding equitable compensation for breach 
of trust. It is suggested that there are good reasons for equity to adopt 
its own particular approach, but the comments of Lord Toulson and 
Lord Neuberger are likely to prove to be influential. It is therefore worth 
considering whether the rules of equitable compensation should mirror 
those available for breach of contract, or for tort (although if the latter 
it would need to be determined whether an analogy should be made 
with negligence, deceit, or some other tortious wrong). However, before 
examining the principles of equitable compensation in greater depth, the 
4. John Heydon, Mark Leeming & Peter Turner, Meagher Gummow 
and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 5d (London: LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2015), as the editors of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane 
have recently observed “[t]he advent of the term “equitable compensation” 
in the last two to three decades supplied a name to a form of relief which 
derived from the principles of account, but was awarded without the 
accounting procedures” at 23-30. 
5. AIB, supra note 1 at para 71.
6. [2010] HKCFA 64 [Akai]. 
7. Ibid at para 155. See also Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co, [1991] 
3 SCR 534 at 585-87 [Canson].
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decision in AIB should first be explained.8 
II. The Demise of Falsification?
“The basic right of a beneficiary is to have the trust duly administered 
in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument, if any, and 
the general law”.9 The traditional means used to ensure the proper 
administration of the trust was for the beneficiary to take an account. 
Upon discovering a breach of trust, a beneficiary might falsify or surcharge 
the account. If the trustee had failed to exercise due care and skill leading 
to the fund not being worth as much as it would have been if managed 
by a reasonably prudent trustee, the account could be surcharged.10 If the 
trustee misapplied trust monies in breach of trust, then the beneficiary 
was entitled to falsify that disbursement.11 As Lord Sumption explained 
in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria,12 “[i]f the trustee misapplied the 
assets, equity would ignore the misapplication and simply hold him to 
account for the assets as if he had acted in accordance with his trust”.13
A good example was provided by the case of Re Dawson.14 In 1939, 
a trustee paid away NZ£4,700 in breach of trust. At the time of the 
improper disbursement, there was parity between the New Zealand 
8. See Lusina Ho, “Equitable Compensation on the Road to Damascus?” 
(2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 213; Peter Turner, “The New 
Fundamental Norm of Recovery for Losses to Express Trusts” (2015) 74:2 
Cambridge Law Journal 188; Paul Davies, “Remedies for Breach of Trust” 
(2015) 78:4 Modern Law Review 681; Peter Watts, "Agents' Disbursal 
of Funds in Breach of Instructions" (2016) 1 Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 118.
9. Target, supra note 2 at 434; see also AIB, supra note 1 at para 64.
10. Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew, [1998] Ch 1 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) at 
17 [Mothew]; Fry v Fry (1859), 27 Beav 144 (Ch (Eng)); Nestle v National 
Westminster Bank plc, [1993] 1 WLR 1260 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) [Nestle]; Re 
Mulligan, [1998] 1 NZLR 481 (HC) [Mulligan].
11. Knott v Cottee (1852), 16 Beav 77 (Ch (Eng)) [Knott]; Re Massingberd’s 
Settlement (1890), 63 LT 296 (CA (Eng)); Re Dawson (dec’d), [1966] 
NSWR 211 (SC (Austl)) [Re Dawson].
12. [2014] UKSC 10. 
13. Ibid at para 13.
14. Re Dawson, supra note 11.
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pound and Australian pound. However, by the time the claim was made 
against the trustee to restore the trust estate, NZ£4,700 was worth 
nearly A£6,000. In a judgment which has been influential throughout 
the Commonwealth, Justice Street held that the defaulting trustee was 
under a strict liability to make good the trust fund. In order to restore 
the trust fund to the position it would have been in had the money not 
wrongly been paid away, the trustee was required to pay A£6,000. Street 
J reviewed the authorities15 and concluded that: 
[t]he cases to which I have referred demonstrate that the obligation to make 
restitution, which courts of equity have from very early times imposed on 
defaulting trustees and other fiduciaries is of a more absolute nature than the 
common law obligation to pay damages for tort or breach of contract.16 
Indeed, the judge held that “[c]onsiderations of causation, foreseeability 
and remoteness do not readily enter the matter”.17 
In effect, the wrongdoing trustee in Re Dawson was taken to have 
paid away his own monies rather than the monies of the trust fund, since 
equity would not countenance the possibility that the trustee acted badly 
when it could insist that the trustee acted properly. The trustee was held 
up to his primary obligation to act as a reasonable and honest trustee. As 
a trustee was still under a primary obligation to account for NZ£4,700 
to the trust fund, and this the trustee could still do. Upon the beneficiary 
falsifying the account to delete the unauthorised disbursement, the 
trustee had the option of restoring the relevant trust property in specie 
— in other words the particular monies paid away — or the money 
15. Including Caffrey v Darby (1801), 6 Ves Jr 488 (Ch (Eng)); Clough v Bond 
(1838), 3 My & C 490 (Ch (Eng)).
16. Re Dawson, supra note 11 at 216.
17. Ibid at 215.
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substitute,18 out of the trustee’s own funds.19 This is a different approach 
from that taken by the common law. As Lord Millett has explained, 
extra-judicially:
Lord Diplock has said that a contracting party is under a primary obligation to 
perform his contract and a secondary obligation to pay damages if he does not. 
It is tempting, but wrong, to assume that a trustee is likewise under a primary 
obligation to perform the trust and a secondary obligation to pay equitable 
compensation if he does not. The primary obligation of a trustee is to account 
for his stewardship. The primary remedy of the beneficiary – any beneficiary no 
matter how limited his interest – is to have the account taken, to surcharge and 
falsify the account, and to require the trustee to restore to the trust estate any 
deficiency which may appear when the account is taken. The liability is strict. 
The account must be taken down to the date on which it is rendered. That is 
why there is no question of “stopping the clock”.20 
However, the House of Lords shifted away from this approach, at least 
in the context of “commercial” trusts, in Target. Redferns was a firm of 
solicitors acting for both the borrowers and the lender, Target Holdings. 
Redferns held the mortgage advance of £1.5 million on a bare trust for 
Target Holdings, with authority to release the money to the borrowers only 
upon receipt of the executed conveyance and mortgage of the property. 
In breach of trust, Redferns released the money before the documents 
were executed. The property was in due course found to be worth only 
£500,000. Target Holdings argued that Redferns should reconstitute the 
trust fund by paying the difference between the value of the property 
and the money advanced to the borrowers. This was accepted by the 
18. It is for this reason that the language of “substitutive compensation” is 
sometimes used: see Steven Elliott, Compensation Claims Against Trustees 
(PhD Dissertation, Oxford University Faculty of Law Library, 2002 
[unpublished]; Steven Elliott & James Edelman, “Money Remedies 
Against Trustees” (2004) 18:3 Tolley’s Trust Law International 116; 
Agricultural Land Management Ltd v Jackson [No 2], [2014] WASC 102 
(Austl) at paras 334-49 [Jackson (No 2)].
19. Knott, supra note 11 at paras 79, 80; Re Bennison (1889), 60 LT 859 (Ch 
(Eng); Re Salmon (1889), 42 Ch D 351 (CA (Eng)) at 357 [Salmon].
20. Peter Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 114 Law 
Quarterly Review 214 at 255.
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Court of Appeal,21 but rejected by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who gave 
the only reasoned speech in the House of Lords. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
effectively reasoned in terms of the trustee being under a “secondary 
obligation” to compensate the beneficiary for losses caused by the breach 
of trust — precisely the approach criticised by Lord Millett in the passage 
quoted above. 
Yet even the decision in Target did not necessarily mean that the 
“traditional” approach to falsification of the account was moribund, as 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson also said:
I have no doubt that, until the underlying commercial transaction has been 
completed, the solicitor can be required to restore to client account moneys 
wrongly paid away. But to import into such a trust an obligation to restore 
the trust fund once the transaction has been completed would be entirely 
artificial.22 
Significantly, in Target the relevant mortgage documents were subsequently 
executed and received by Redferns. Since Redferns remained trustees even 
after their breach of trust, Redferns still had the authority to receive those 
mortgage documents as trustees on behalf of the trust.23 The trust fund 
had therefore been reconstituted and there was nothing wrong with the 
state of the trust fund at the time the account was taken: Target Holdings 
was entitled to see either £1.5 million or the mortgage documents in the 
trust fund. The latter was present, so there was no defect in the fund. 
Remedies in equity are assessed at the date of judgment, not the date of 
breach.24 Using the language of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, it might be said 
that the transaction had been “completed” upon receipt of the mortgage 
documents.
Such reasoning meant that, even after Target, some courts continued 
to employ the strict approach of falsifying the account, awarding 
substantial relief even where the trustee’s breach of duty did not cause any 
21. This claim succeeded in the Court of Appeal: Target Holdings v Redferns, 
[1994] 1 WLR 1089 (CA (Civ)(Eng)). 
22. Target, supra note 2 at 436.
23. Millett, supra note 20; Matthew Conaglen, “Explaining Target Holdings v 
Redferns” (2010) 4:3 Journal of Equity 288.
24. Target, supra note 2 at 437; see too AIB, supra note 1 at para 140.
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loss. For example, in Knight v Haynes Duffell Kentish & Co25 (“Knight”), 
the claimants advanced monies to its solicitors, Linnels. Linnels was to 
pay the monies to a company on completion of a transaction. Upon 
completion, a trade name was to be assigned to the claimants. In breach 
of trust, Linnels paid away the monies without ensuring the assignment of 
the trade name. The claimants therefore instructed the defendant firm of 
solicitors (HDK) to recover its losses from Linnels, but HDK delayed the 
litigation to such an extent that it was ultimately struck out for want of 
prosecution. The claimants therefore sued HDK for the lost opportunity 
to sue Linnels in breach of trust. Even though the trademark was actually 
worthless, the Court of Appeal held that such facts did not affect the 
remedy to be awarded. The Court was not concerned with compensating 
losses caused by Linnels’ breach of trust, but rather with falsifying the 
disbursement made in breach of trust. As Lord Justice Aldous said:
First, in the present case the breach was the release of the money. The trust 
required the money to be held against provision of both the shares and the 
assignment. As there had been no assignment, the money should not have been 
paid out. Second, the principle in Target only applies where the underlying 
transaction covered by the trust had been completed.26 
In Knight, the transaction had not been completed. The Court of Appeal 
therefore decided that the facts fell outside the scope of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s causal analysis in Target. 
The decision in Knight seems to be consistent with the traditional 
approach to the accounting process, but has perhaps now been 
undermined by the decision in AIB. Mark Redler & Co is a firm of 
solicitors which was retained to act for the Sondhi family and AIB, a bank, 
on the re-mortgage of the Sondhis’ family home. AIB advanced £3.3 
million to Redler for this purpose. The letter of instruction incorporated 
the Council of Mortgage Lenders’ Handbook for England and Wales,27 
by virtue of which the mortgage lender required a fully enforceable first 
charge over the property and that all existing charges be redeemed on or 
25. [2003] EWCA Civ 223.
26. Ibid at para 38.
27. Council of Mortgage Lenders, “CML lenders’ handbook for conveyances” 
(2015), online: <www.cml.org.uk/cml/handbook>.
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before completion. The handbook also stated: “You [Redler] must hold 
the loan on trust for us [AIB] until completion. If completion is delayed, 
you must return it to us when and how we tell you”. 
The Sondhis’ property was already subject to a charge in favour of 
Barclays Bank Plc. The Barclays charge secured borrowings of about £1.5 
million on two accounts. Unfortunately, Redler only paid to Barclays 
enough money to pay off one of the two accounts (about £1.2 million), 
which was insufficient to redeem the Barclays charge. £309,000 remained 
outstanding. Barclays refused to release its charge unless the debt was 
paid in full. The borrowers, who had received the balance of the £3.3 
million, initially promised to do so, but never did. Redler tried to resolve 
its error without involving AIB but eventually told the bank of the breach 
of duty; AIB then negotiated directly with Barclays, and AIB’s charge was 
registered as a second charge. The Sondhis subsequently defaulted on the 
loan and declared bankruptcy. The property was sold by Barclays for £1.2 
million. AIB as second chargee received £867, 697. 
By paying away the mortgage monies without obtaining a first legal 
charge over the property, Redler acted in breach of trust.28 AIB argued 
that completion had not yet occurred, so Redler remained under a duty 
to hold the mortgage advance on trust for AIB. AIB therefore sought 
£3.3 million in order to reconstitute the trust fund.29 Redler, on the other 
hand, argued that its liability should be limited to the difference in value 
of the bank’s security caused by Redler’s failure to pay off the entirety of 
the Barclays charge; this was only around £300,000 (the sum received by 
Barclays as first chargee). 
Redler’s argument succeeded at every level. A unanimous Supreme 
28. AIB, supra note 1 at para 140 Lord Reed was attracted by the idea that the 
breach of trust only involved the misapplication of the £309,000 paid to 
the Sondhi’s rather than Barclays, but this had been rejected by the Court 
of Appeal and was not challenged in the Supreme Court; the breach of 
trust was paying away the entire £3.3 million.
29. Strictly the claim was for £3.3 million minus the £867,697 actually 
received from the sale of the property.
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Court30 insisted that a causal link between Redler’s breach of duty and 
AIB’s loss needed to be established, regardless of whether the claim was 
brought at common law or in equity. 
There was one potentially important difference between Target and 
AIB. In Target, the relevant mortgage documents were subsequently 
executed and received by Redferns. In AIB, Redler never obtained a first 
legal charge over the property in favour of AIB. AIB thought that since 
completion required there to be a first legal charge in its favour, and 
this never eventuated, completion had not occurred, and that as a result 
Redler was required to restore the monies wrongly paid away. Yet Lord 
Toulson side-stepped such arguments because: 
as a commercial matter the transaction was executed or ‘completed’ when the 
loan monies were released to the borrowers. At that moment the relationship 
between the borrowers and the bank became one of contractual borrower and 
lender.31 
This pragmatic approach is perhaps understandable given the context of 
the dispute in question. AIB was anxious to push through the Sondhis’ 
remortgage of the property, which was “driven by the need to facilitate 
business lending which the bank was very keen to make”.32 But the 
result very much broadens the scope of “completion”. The Supreme 
Court was prepared to find that there was completion upon satisfaction 
of the commercial purpose, but this is less certain than insisting upon 
compliance with the terms of the solicitor’s instructions. Redler’s breach 
of trust meant that there was no completion in accordance with the 
requirements of Redler’s instructions. The decision in AIB makes it more 
difficult for a lender — or any settlor — to set the terms of completion. 
A court might find there to be completion even if the beneficiary would 
not agree. Indeed, AIB did not simply seek the relationship of lender-
borrower; AIB wanted to be a secured lender with priority over other 
chargees. It might be thought that this commercial purpose was not 
fulfilled. 
30. Lord Toulson and Lord Reed gave reasoned speeches; Lord Neuberger, 
Lady Hale, and Lord Wilson agreed with both speeches.
31. AIB, supra note 1 at para 74.
32. See e.g. AIB, supra note 1 at para 14.
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It is suggested that the approach taken in AIB may be unfortunate. 
It restricts the ability of settlors to define completion according to their 
wishes. For instance, imagine that, in breach of trust, a trustee purchased 
a second-hand car rather than a new car. Has the transaction been 
completed? On the approach of the Supreme Court in AIB, it might 
be tempting to conclude that, since the trustee has purchased a car, the 
beneficiary should simply sue for the difference in value between the 
second-hand car he now has rather than the new car he was entitled to 
under the terms of the trust. Yet it seems unsatisfactory for the wrong type 
of car to be the beneficiary’s problem, rather than the trustee’s problem. 
There was a clear logic behind equity’s traditional recognition of 
the beneficiary’s ability to choose to falsify the disbursement made and 
treat the car as having been purchased with the trustee’s own money; on 
that approach, the unwanted second-hand car was the trustee’s problem 
to deal with. The hassle of selling it to realise its value, for example, 
lay with the wrongdoing trustee rather than the innocent beneficiary. 
This is admittedly different from the approach at common law, but, as 
Lord Millett explained,33 this might be justified by the higher standards 
demanded by equity. A trustee holds particular power over a beneficiary 
and a beneficiary’s assets, and should be held to a higher standard. 
It is important that a trustee complies with the terms of the trust 
instrument. 
A second-hand car can never become a new car, whereas a second 
charge could become a first charge in circumstances akin to AIB. The 
two cases might therefore be distinguished. At first instance in AIB, His 
Honour Judge David Cooke observed: 
[t]here is no parallel between a charge which is, at the moment of creation, 
a second ranking security but can be (and is intended and required to be) 
promoted into a first ranking security by redeeming a prior charge, and a 
second hand car which can never be transmuted into a new one. The former is 
what the solicitors were authorised and instructed to obtain in this case and the 
latter is, on [counsel’s] hypothesis, an unauthorised purchase.34 
This analogy was not pursued on appeal, but the more expansive approach 
33. Millett, supra note 20. 
34. AIB Group (UK) v Mark Redler & Co, [2012] EWHC 35 (Ch) at para 30. 
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of Lord Toulson in particular suggests that the focus should be upon the 
loss caused by the breach of duty in both instances.
Lord Toulson clearly favoured a shift away from what might have 
been considered to be earlier orthodoxy. His Lordship thought that 
treating the trustee solicitors as having paid away their own monies 
in AIB was simply “fairy tales”.35 It might nonetheless be thought that 
since the solicitors had no authority to pay the money away without 
obtaining a first legal charge in return, any “fiction” that might be 
introduced could be tolerated. But in any event, even if the monies paid 
away are considered to be trust monies that does not inevitably lead to 
the conclusion that the court should only award compensation for loss. 
As Lord Justice Longmore recently observed: “[e]quity’s response to the 
breach of this trust is not to give redress for the breach in the form of 
equitable compensation but to enforce the duty”.36 The means by which 
the trustee’s duty is enforced is through an action in debt.
The action for the agreed sum, or debt claim, is obviously not peculiar 
to equity. It is not a claim for loss, or concerned with any secondary 
obligations that might arise after a breach of duty. Rather, the action 
for the agreed sum seeks to enforce the primary obligations voluntarily 
assumed by the defendant in the action. The action for an “equitable 
debt” was apparently accepted by earlier cases. For example, in ex parte 
Adamson, In re Collie,37 Lord Justice of Appeal James and Lord Justice of 
Appeal Baggallay noted that relief in such cases was by way of “a suit … 
for equitable debt or liability in the nature of a debt. It was a suit for the 
restitution of the actual money or thing, or value of the thing, of which 
the cheated party had been cheated”.38 This also explains the outcome of 
cases such as Re Dawson and Knight.
In AIB Lord Toulson dismissed the analysis based upon debt. He 
recognised that the authorities do refer to “an equitable debt, or liability 
35. AIB, supra note 1 at para 69.
36. Novoship (UK) Ltd v Nikitin, [2014] EWCA Civ 908 at para 104.
37. (1878), 8 Ch D 807 (CA (Eng)) [Collie]. 
38. Ibid at 819. See also In re Smith, Fleming & Co (1879), 11 Ch D 306 (CA 
(Eng)) at 311, per James LJ; Webb v Stenton (1883), 11 QBD 518 (CA 
(Eng)) at 530, per Fry LJ.
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in the nature of a debt”,39 but thought that the language of debt was 
only used because it was necessary “long before the expression ‘equitable 
compensation’ entered the vocabulary”.40 Lord Toulson concluded that 
equity only ever really awarded compensation which was “clothed by 
the court in the literary costume of equitable debt, the debt being for 
the amount of the loss caused by the fraud”.41 The evocative rhetoric is 
not, however, entirely convincing. It is not apparent from such earlier 
cases that the language of debt was simply a “literary costume”. Indeed, 
an action for the agreed sum may appear particularly appropriate in a 
situation where the trustee has undertaken to return trust monies to the 
beneficiary if completion according to the instructions does not occur.42 
This was precisely the case in AIB. After all, the bank had stipulated that 
“You [Redler] must hold the loan on trust for us [AIB] until completion. 
If completion is delayed, you must return it to us when and how we 
tell you”.43 It is possible to view this as having created an obligation for 
Redler to pay AIB £3.3 million. This debt could be discharged either by 
Redler’s paying over £3.3 million to AIB, or by ensuring completion of 
the transaction. The completion of the transaction would have discharged 
the obligation to pay the debt. This analysis was rejected by Lord Toulson, 
who said that “a monetary award which reflected neither loss caused nor 
profit gained by the wrongdoer would be penal”.44 This would mean 
that all debt claims, even those brought at common law,45 should be 
considered penal in nature. That would be a startling conclusion. It is 
not penal to hold a party — particularly a trustee — up to the duties to 
which he or she voluntarily assented.46 This cannot be the view which 
39. AIB, supra note 1 at para 61, citing Collie, supra note 37.
40. AIB, supra note 1 at para 61.
41. Ibid. See also Ho, supra note 8 at 215-16.
42. AIB, supra note 1 at para 4.
43. See text following note 27.
44. AIB, supra note 1 at para 64.
45. Common law claims are not at all uncommon: see, notoriously, White & 
Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor, [1962] AC 413 (HL). 
46. Thus the remedies of specific performance and injunction – which 
similarly enforce the primary obligations owed – should also not be 
considered to be penal.
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Lord Toulson truly intended to express. 
Nevertheless, there are clearly significant differences between the old 
orthodoxy and the new approach. For instance, in Hall v Libertarian 
Investments Ltd 47 (“Libertarian”), Lord Millett, sitting as a non-permanent 
judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, emphasised that after 
an unauthorised disbursement has been falsified, the trustee must make 
good the deficit in the trust fund either in specie or in money, but that 
this is “not compensation for loss”.48 Yet in AIB, Lord Reed thought that 
“[i]f the property cannot be restored  in specie, the trustee must restore 
the trust fund to the position it would have been in but for the breach, 
by paying into the fund sufficient pecuniary compensation to meet that 
objective”.49 Shifting away from an action for the agreed sum towards 
compensation allows scope for arguments surrounding consequential 
loss which are simply irrelevant in a debt claim. After all, if a builder 
completes his or her work for a client and then sues the client for the 
agreed sum, it does not matter that the builder did not really suffer any 
loss at all (because if he had not done the work he would have suffered 
even greater losses) or that the builder suffered much more extensive 
losses (because the work was much more expensive than envisaged). The 
client would simply have to pay the builder the agreed sum. 
However, according to the decision in AIB, this analysis based upon 
the liquidated sum should no longer be employed when trustees pay away 
money in breach of trust. The focus should instead be upon awarding 
compensation for loss. Before analysing how equitable compensation 
should be understood in greater detail, it is important to highlight some 
further limitations and difficulties with the decision in AIB which might 
restrict its impact elsewhere in the common law world.
47. [2013] HKCFA 93 [Libertarian].
48. Ibid at 168. 
49. AIB, supra note 1 at para 90.
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III. The Scope of AIB
A. Geographical Scope
In FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC 50 (“FHR”), 
Lord Neuberger, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated: “it seems to us 
highly desirable for all those jurisdictions to learn from each other, and at 
least to lean in favour of harmonising the development of the common 
law round the world”.51 This was picked up by Lord Reed in AIB,52 and 
Lord Toulson also relied upon decisions elsewhere in the common law 
world in favouring a compensatory approach. However, it is uncertain 
whether the reasoning in AIB will convince the highest courts in other 
jurisdictions.53 Lord Reed thought that there exists: 
a broad measure of consensus across a number of common law jurisdictions 
that the correct general approach to the assessment of equitable compensation 
for breach of trust is that described by Justice McLachlin (as she then was) 
in Canson54 and endorsed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Target.55 
However, it is unclear how broad any measure of consensus really is. 
Canson is a much-cited decision, but concerned a lawyer’s conflict of 
duty rather than a breach of trust.56 The lawyer did not hold any 
property on trust, so there was no breach of any custodial duty. Indeed, 
the court in Canson explicitly recognised that breach of trust cases 
required reconstitution of trust funds and that equitable compensation 
was only appropriate where reconstitution was not possible. McLachlin 
J even said that “compensation is an equitable monetary remedy which 
50. [2014] UKSC 45 [FHR].
51. Ibid at para 45.
52. AIB, supra note 1 at para 121.
53. The question seems open in Singapore: see e.g. Maryani Sadeli v Arjun 
Permanand Samtani, [2014] SGCA 55; Then Khek Koon v Arjun 
Permanand Samtani, [2014] 1 SLR 245 (Sing (HC)).
54. Canson, supra note 7.
55. AIB, supra note 1 at para 133.
56. For thorough discussion, see Lionel Smith, “The Measurement of 
Compensation Claims Against Trustees and Fiduciaries” in Elise Bant 
& M Harding, eds, Exploring Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) at 363.
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is available when the equitable remedies of restitution and account are 
not appropriate”.57 Lord Reed cited subsequent decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in support of McLachlin J’s dissenting speech, but 
none concerned a misapplication of trust property.58 Similarly, a trust 
was not at issue in the decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 
Premium Real Estate Ltd v Stevens.59 
There is, in principle, a distinction between breaches of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty and breaches of the custodial duties of a trustee.60 Yet 
by relying upon cases properly concerning breach of fiduciary duty as 
relevant to cases concerning breach of trust, the decisions in Target and 
AIB have blurred the boundaries. This might suggest a shift in approach, 
such that the principles relevant to claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
are also relevant to claims for breach of trust. That will be considered 
more fully below. But it is a little odd that there is no recognition in 
either Target or AIB that this is a potentially controversial step, and 
the lack of transparency over the moves made by the Supreme Court 
undermines the persuasiveness of its actions. Indeed, in Target — the 
origin of this shift in approach — Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not even 
mention the word “falsify”, and instead relied upon cases concerned with 
surcharge61 or breach of fiduciary duty62 in support of his conclusion that 
57. Canson, supra note 7 at 556.
58. AIB, supra note 1 at para 122, Lord Reed cited M(K) v M(H), [1992] 3 
SCR 6 (which concerned incest); Cadbury Schweppes v FBI Foods, [1999] 
1 SCR 142 (which concerned breach of confidence); and Hodgkinson v 
Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377 (which involved breach of fiduciary duty due 
to conflict of interest).
59. [2009] NZSC 15 cited in AIB, supra note 1 at para 126 Lord Reed 
explicitly recognised that the other New Zealand case upon which he 
relied, although a trust case, was essentially an example of surcharge rather 
than falsification: Bank of New Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co 
Ltd, [1999] 1 NZLR 664 (CA) [Bank of New Zealand], cited at AIB, supra 
note 1 at para 127.
60. James Penner, “Distinguishing Fiduciary, Trust and Accounting 
Relationships” (2014) 8 Journal of Equity 203.
61.  See e.g. Nestle, supra note 10; Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (Nos 1 
and 2), [1980] Ch 515 (Eng) [Bartlett Nos 1 and 2].
62. See notably Canson, supra note 7.
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the only remedy open to Target Holdings was equitable compensation.63 
Nevertheless, this inclination to blur conceptual boundaries may be 
gathering sufficient steam that it is too late to reverse the trend. For 
instance, Lord Toulson in AIB,64 and Permanent Judge Ribeiro in 
Libertarian65 cited with approval the following schema of Justice Tipping 
in BNZ v NZ Guardian Trust Co Ltd:66
[b]reaches of duty by trustees and other fiduciaries may broadly be of three 
different kinds. First, there are breaches leading directly to damage to or loss of 
the trust property; second, there are breaches involving an element of infidelity 
or disloyalty which engage the conscience of the fiduciary; third, there are 
breaches involving a lack of appropriate skill or care.67
Ribeiro PJ thought that the principles for quantifying loss were the same 
in the first two categories of case. This might provide some support for 
the approach taken in AIB. 
However, it is important to note that the decision of the Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal in Libertarian essentially concerned surcharge 
rather than falsification. In Libertarian, the trustee held monies for the 
purpose of acquiring shares in a company on behalf of the beneficiary. In 
breach of trust, the trustee misappropriated the trust monies and falsely 
told the beneficiary that the relevant shares had been acquired. The value 
of the shares rose considerably. Faced with such facts, the beneficiary 
could have falsified the disbursement made and sought reconstitution 
of the trust fund through the trustee’s paying back the money taken, 
but this was much less valuable than a reparative claim for the losses 
suffered through not acquiring the shares as instructed. The beneficiary 
therefore sued the trustee for the lost profits that would have been 
made if the trustee had acted in accordance with his duties. This was 
therefore a case of loss: the beneficiary sought the difference between 
the value of the trust fund at the date of judgment and the value that 
63. See e.g. Charles Mitchell “Equitable Compensation for Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty” (2013) 66:1 Current Legal Problems 307 at 323-27.
64. AIB, supra note 1 at para 60.
65. Libertarian, supra note 47 at para 75. 
66. Bank of New Zealand, supra note 59. 
67. Ibid at 678.
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the trust fund would have had had the trustee acted properly. However, 
Lord Millett also considered the basis of falsification and insisted that 
it was inappropriate to consider compensation for loss in instances of 
restoration following a misapplication of trust assets.68 The two sides of 
the account — falsification and surcharge — rest on different bases.
Lord Millett’s comments in Libertarian do not sit comfortably 
with the thrust of the reasoning in AIB. Nor does the judgment of the 
High Court of Australia in Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris 
Fletcher69 (“Youyang”) seem entirely consistent with that in AIB. In 
Youyang, a company paid over monies to solicitors for the purposes of an 
investment. Part of those monies were to be paid away by the solicitors 
in return for a bearer deposit certificate which would provide security 
for the investment. Upon receipt of that certificate, the solicitors would 
then pay the rest of the money to an investment company for investment 
in speculative market activities. In breach of trust, the solicitors paid the 
money away without receiving the bearer certificate. Lord Reed observed 
that Youyang was based on “broadly analogous facts” to Target, “with the 
important distinction that the security — which would have been good 
— was never provided”.70 This clearly enabled Target to be distinguished; 
the High Court in Youyang ordered the solicitors to repay the monies 
wrongly paid away in breach of trust. Lord Reed thought that this meant 
Youyang was consistent with Target. That must be right on the question 
of whether or not the fund was reconstituted. But it is less clear whether 
the reasoning in Youyang is truly consistent with AIB. The first legal 
charge over the Sondhis’ property was not provided in AIB, just as the 
security in Youyang was never provided, yet Redler was not ordered to 
repay the monies advanced in breach of the trust. The High Court in 
Youyang was unconcerned with loss, and uninterested in the fact that 
the conduct of third parties meant that the loss suffered by the claimants 
would have happened anyway. As the High Court held that Youyang was 
not provided at any stage with the security for which it had bargained. It 
68. Libertarian, supra note 47 at para 168.
69. [2003] HCA 15 [Youyang].
70. AIB, supra note 1 at para 124, per Lord Reed.
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is not to the point that, in addition to the breaches of trust by Minters, 
there may also have been dishonest and discreditable subsequent acts by 
third parties which led to the loss of the funds.71 To present the case by 
fixing upon those subsequent acts, to adopt the remarks of Bowen LJ 
in Magnus,72 would be “an ocular illusion”, because the loss of the trust 
funds occurred as soon as the trustee wrongly disbursed them, at the 
completion on 24 September 1993.73 
The High Court insisted that trustees need to be “kept up to their 
duty”.74 In AIB, by contrast, the fact that the loss would have happened 
anyway did affect the compensatory remedy awarded. Perhaps the cases 
are distinguishable since the reason why the losses would have happened 
anyway in Youyang was the conduct of a third party, whereas in AIB the 
reason was a fall in the property market. The reasoning of Youyang is not 
obviously the same as that employed in AIB. The High Court of Australia 
did not focus upon loss caused by a breach of duty, whereas this was 
central to the decision in AIB.
B. Commercial Trusts
After Target, the scope of the compensatory approach was a little unclear 
given Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s novel distinction between traditional 
and commercial trusts. His Lordship said:
[t]he obligation to reconstitute the trust fund applicable in the case of 
traditional trusts reflects the fact that no one beneficiary is entitled to the trust 
property and the need to compensate all beneficiaries for the breach. That 
rationale has no application to a case such as the present. To impose such 
an obligation in order to enable the beneficiary solely entitled (i.e. the client) 
to recover from the solicitor more than the client has in fact lost flies in the 
face of common sense and is in direct conflict with the basic principles of 
equitable compensation. In my judgment, once a conveyancing transaction 
has been completed the client has no right to have the solicitor’s client account 
71. McCann v Switzerland Insurance [2000], 203 CLR 579 (HCA) at 18, 135; 
Magnus v Queensland National Bank (1888), 37 Ch D 466 (CA (Eng)) at 
471-72, 477, 479-80 [Magnus] cited in Youyang, supra note 69 at para 63.
72. Magnus, supra note 71 at 480.
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reconstituted as a ‘trust fund’.75
This distinction between “traditional” and “commercial” trusts has been 
questioned.76 For example, in Bairstow v Queens Moat Houses Plc,77 Lord 
Justice Robert Walker said:
[i]t may be that a more satisfactory dividing line is not that between the 
traditional trust and the commercial trust, but between a breach of fiduciary 
duty in the wrongful disbursement of funds of which the fiduciary has this 
sort of trustee-like stewardship and a breach of fiduciary duty of a different 
character (for instance a solicitor’s failure to disclose a conflict of interest as 
in Canson).78
In AIB, Lord Reed noted this controversy, and said “[t]hat it is not to 
say that there is a categorical distinction between trusts in commercial 
and non-commercial relationships”.79 The duties and liabilities of trustees 
depend upon the terms of the trust and relationship between the parties. 
Lord Toulson held that “it is a fact that a commercial trust differs from a 
typical traditional trust in that it arises out of a contract rather than the 
transfer of property by way of gift. The contract defines the parameters of 
the trust”.80 In such circumstances, the duties of the trustee are “likely to 
be closely defined and may be of limited duration”.81
Lord Toulson cited with approval an article by Professor Hayton.82 
75. Target, supra note 2 at 436.
76. See also Youyang, supra note 69 where the High Court of Australia 
considered it preferable to focus on “the scope and purpose of the trust” 
at para 49. It may be that an account should only be available where 
there is continuous and custodial trusteeship: Joshua Getzler, “Equitable 
Compensation and the Regulation of Fiduciary Relationships” in Peter 
Birks & Francis Rose, eds, Restitution and Equity Volume 1: Resulting Trusts 
and Equitable Compensation (London: Mansfield Press, 2000) 249 at 249-
50.
77. [2001] EWCA Civ 712. 
78. Ibid at para 53.
79. AIB, supra note 1 at para 102.
80. Ibid at para 70.
81. Ibid. See also AIB, supra note 1 at paras 33, 67. 
82. Ibid at para 71, citing David Hayton “Unique Rules for the Unique 
Institution, the Trust” in Simone Degeling & James Edelman, eds, Equity 
in Commercial Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2005).
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Hayton argued that “where a bare trust is mere incidental machinery 
in the furtherance of a contractual agreement it seems that there are 
sufficient policy reasons to oust traditional trust law principles as to 
consequential losses”.83 It might therefore be arguable that the Supreme 
Court in AIB was essentially focused upon the remedies that flow from a 
breach of a bare, commercial trust. If so, the traditional approach towards 
falsification may be maintained in the context of traditional trusts. After 
all, the departure from the general, traditional approach in one particular 
area does not necessarily undermine the more general rule. Yet the tenor of 
the judgment in AIB suggests that the same rules should apply regardless 
of whether a “commercial” or “traditional” trust is at issue.84 Indeed, the 
contrary would be somewhat strange: a lay trustee acting gratuitously 
for a traditional trust might be subject to more stringent liability than a 
professional who is paid for his services. This may be specially odd since 
professional trustees are more likely to enjoy the benefit of an exemption 
clause.85 It is suggested that AIB is likely to lead to a focus upon loss 
caused by a breach of trust, regardless of the type of trust at issue. There is 
perhaps a certain irony in this conclusion. Some commentators forcefully 
argued that no distinction should be drawn between commercial trusts 
and traditional trusts in order to maintain the traditional approach of 
falsification in all contexts.86 Those arguments against a commercial-
traditional trust divide are persuasive, but are now likely to be used to 
focus attention upon equitable compensation for loss caused in respect 
of breaches of all types of trust.
IV. Principles of Equitable Compensation
The scope and meaning of “equitable compensation” remains unclear. 
It was used in FHR to cover a personal claim for an account of profits 
83. Hayton, supra note 82 at 305; see also Akai, supra note 6. 
84. Peter Turner, “The New Fundamental Norm of Recovery for Losses to 
Express Trusts” (2015) 74:2 Cambridge Law Journal 188.
85. See e.g. Armitage v Nurse, [1998] Ch 241 (CA (Civ)(Eng)); Walker v 
Stones, [2001] QBD 902 (CA (Civ)(Eng)).
86. See e.g. Millett, supra note 20 at 224-25.
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made in breach of fiduciary duty.87 That remedy is probably best seen as 
restitutionary or gain-based rather than compensatory, since the claimant 
need not suffer any loss.88 Equitable compensation should exclusively 
denote loss-based claims. It is important to consider the principles that 
inform an award of equitable compensation.
It appears that similar principles might now apply to both 
“falsification” and “surcharge” cases. In Target, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
relied upon cases of surcharge in the context of a claim which was really 
based upon falsification,89 and the elision between the two appears to now 
be complete since Lord Toulson concluded that “in a practical sense both 
are reparative compensation”.90 It will therefore be important to consider 
the principles underpinning “reparative compensation” or “surcharge” 
since they appear to underpin the award of equitable compensation for 
breach of trust more generally. 
Beneficiaries have often sought to surcharge the trust fund where the 
trustee has failed to comply with his duties of care, meaning that the fund 
is not worth as much as it would have been had the trustee not breached 
his duties. At times, the principles of surcharge have developed by 
reference to the principles of falsification.91 For instance, in Re Mulligan 
Justice Panckhurst cited cases such as Re Dawson before saying:
I accept that the obligation to make restitution imposed on defaulting trustees 
and fiduciaries is more absolute than the common law obligation to pay 
damages for tort or breach of contract, and the considerations of causation, 
foreseeability or remoteness are not of great moment […] 92 
However, the language of restitution or restoration seems inapt in 
the context of reparative compensation. As the editors of Meagher, 
Gummow and Lehane have pointed out: “it stretches belief to speak of 
restoration — suggesting restoration to a prior position — when the relief 
is designed to place the trust or the fiduciary’s principal in the presently 
87. See e.g. FHR, supra note 50 at para 1, per Lord Neuberger.
88. Cf. FHR, supra note 50 at para 120, per Lord Reed. 
89. See e.g. Nestle, supra note 10; Bartlett Nos 1 and 2, supra note 61.
90. AIB, supra note 1 at para 54.
91. Mitchell, supra note 63 at 320-27.
92. Mulligan, supra note 10 at 507-509.
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correct position”.93 As Lord Justice Brightman put it in Bartlett v Barclays 
Bank Trust Co Ltd (Nos 1 and 2), “the so-called restitution which the 
defendant must now make … is in reality compensation for loss suffered 
by the plaintiffs”.94 
It therefore does not seem appropriate to look across to the falsification 
cases based upon an “equitable debt” when developing principles of 
equitable compensation in the context of surcharge. The better view 
is that principles of reparative compensation have traditionally been 
considered to be distinct from those underpinning falsification. Yet in the 
wake of AIB, it would seem that the principles underpinning reparative 
compensation are relevant to equitable compensation more generally, 
even in the context of misapplied trust property.
In Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew95 (“Mothew”) Lord 
Justice Millett said:
[e]quitable compensation for breach of the duty of skill and care resembles 
common law damages in that it is awarded by way of compensation to the 
plaintiff for his loss. There is no reason in principle why the common law rules 
of causation, remoteness of damage and measure of damages should not be 
applied by analogy in such a case.96
This now seems to be the orthodox approach in England and Wales, even 
though in AIB Lord Reed noted that this “dictum has been questioned, 
or given a restrictive application, in a number of other jurisdictions”.97 
However, it would seem to follow from this passage that the common 
law rules on damages are only applied by analogy. The equitable rules 
exist independently of their common law counterparts. Indeed, there is 
obviously no monolithic concept of the common law rules on damages.98 
The principles differ depending on the nature of the wrong involved 
— breach of contract, the tort of negligence, and the tort of deceit all 
have different rules, for example — and it is important to be clear to 
93. Heydon, supra note 4 at 23-170.
94. Bartlett Nos 1 and 2, supra note 61 at 545.
95. Mothew, supra note 10. 
96. Ibid at para 17.
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what common law wrong an analogy should be made when elucidating 
equitable principles.
Where the breach of duty in question concerns the failure to exercise 
the necessary degree of care and diligence, the view of Millett LJ that a 
stricter approach of equity is not required has some attraction.99 However, 
the drawing of an analogy with common law notions has not been met 
with universal acceptance. For instance, in Youyang, the High Court of 
Australia said:
[h]owever, there must be a real question whether the unique foundation and 
goals of equity, which has the institution of the trust at its heart, warrant 
any assimilation even in this limited way with the measure of compensatory 
damages in tort and contract. It may be thought strange to decide that the 
precept that trustees are to be kept by courts of equity up to their duty has an 
application limited to the observance by trustees of some only of their duties 
to beneficiaries in dealing with trust funds.100
As McLachlin J insisted in Canson, the relationship at issue has “trust, 
not self-interest, at its core, and when the breach occurs, the balance 
favours the person wronged”.101 Given the control the trustee has over 
the beneficiary’s property, leading to a sense of “vulnerability” about the 
beneficiary, there are strong arguments in favour of stricter rules in equity 
which might be employed in order to protect further the beneficiary.102 
Upon taking an account, the focus was very clearly upon the state of 
the trust fund. This is why it has been said that “the relevant loss is the 
loss suffered by the trust estate or the trust fund, not by the beneficiaries 
or objects as such”.103 Yet in Mothew, Millett LJ stated that “[e]quitable 
compensation for breach of the duty of skill and care resembles common 
law damages in that it is awarded by way of compensation to the plaintiff for 
his loss”.104 In a similar vein, in Target, Lord Browne-Wilkinson appeared 
99. NZ Guardian Trust, Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994), 
11 WAR 187 (HCA), per Ipp J. 
100. AIB, supra note 1 at para 39.
101. Canson, supra note 7 at 543. See Heydon, supra note 4 at 23-265, 23-350.
102. See Part V, below.
103. Heydon, supra note 4 at 23-360. See e.g. Re Dawson, supra note 11; 
Salmon, supra note 19 at 371.
104. Mothew, supra note 10 at 17  [emphasis added].
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to state that compensation should be paid to the beneficiary directly; this 
approach was endorsed in AIB.105 Such comments might be limited to 
circumstances where there is a bare trust with a sole beneficiary, but could 
conceivably lead to a focus on a particular beneficiary’s loss, including 
consequential losses.106 This would be another significant development 
brought about by the Target line of cases. However, it is suggested that 
the view expressed by Lord Reed in AIB — that the same remedy should 
be available regardless of whether an account is taken or short-circuited 
by “equitable compensation”107 — tends to indicate that the focus should 
still be on loss suffered by the trust fund, even though analogies drawn 
with the common law may lead to different outcomes.
In any event, it seems sensible to consider how the requirements 
recognised to be relevant to compensation at common law might apply 
in equity.108 As Lord Steyn observed in Smith New Court Securities Ltd v 
Citibank NA109 (“Smith New Court”): 
[i]t is now necessary to consider separately the three limiting principles which, 
even in a case of deceit, serve to keep wrongdoers’ liability within practical and 
sensible limits. The three concepts are causation, remoteness and mitigation. 
In practice the inquiries under these headings overlap. But they are distinct 
legal concepts.110 
In addition, considerations such as contributory negligence and the nature 
of recoverable loss will be considered. 
A. Concurrent Liability
Most claims for breach of trust will be “stand-alone” claims in the sense 
that the only possible claim a beneficiary has against the trustee will be 
for breach of trust. But it is possible for there to be concurrent claims in 
contract and tort as well. Indeed, there was such concurrent liability on 
105. See e.g. AIB, supra note 1 at para 91, per Lord Reed.
106. Jamie Glister, “Breach of Trust and Consequential Loss” (2014) 8:3 
Journal of Equity 235.
107. See e.g. AIB, supra note 1 at para 91; Libertarian, supra note 47. Target, 
supra note 2.
108. See e.g. AIB, supra note 1 at para 81, per Lord Reed.
109. [1997] AC 254 (HL) [Smith New Court]. 
110. Ibid at 284.
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the facts of AIB. Nevertheless, it is important that the equitable principles 
of compensation should not be distorted by considerations regarding 
concurrent liability, when in most instances concurrent liability simply 
will not arise.
On one interpretation of the judgment of Lord Neuberger in Akai,111 
along with that of Lord Toulson in AIB,112 it may be that the equitable 
rules of compensation should be the same as those which apply at 
common law. On another view, the thrust of their Lordships’ reasoning 
may be that, in the commercial context at least, the claimant should 
not recover more through an equitable claim than would be available 
at common law. In some respects, this is unsurprising. Even in the 
context of concurrent claims in contract and tort, there are strong calls 
for the contractual rules to trump the tortious rules, since the parties 
were not strangers and had the opportunity to negotiate as is the case in 
any contractual relationship.113 Following this approach, there may be 
a hierarchy within the law of obligations which could determine which 
set of rules should apply to a claim for compensation on any given set 
of facts. At the pinnacle would be contractual rules, and these should 
govern the particular dispute, regardless of whether the same facts are 
then framed to ground a claim in tort or equity.114
However, this type of approach does not seem likely to prevail. 
Orthodoxy currently insists that where the claimant has a choice 
about whether to sue in contract, tort or equity, he can exercise that 
choice freely, taking into account which claim is likely to benefit him 
111. Akai, supra note 7.
112. Canson, supra note 6.
113. See e.g. Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, 3d 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 88-94; Andrew Burrows, 
“Comparing Compensatory Damages in Contract and Tort: Some 
Problematic Issues” in Simone Degeling, James Edelman & James 
Goudkamp, eds, Torts in Commercial Law (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 
2011) 3 at 3-7. And see also the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP, [2015] EWCA Civ 1146.
114. Cf. Hayton, supra note 82. 
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the most.115 This was recognised by Lord Reed in AIB,116 and seems 
well-established.117 Indeed, it was also accepted by Lord Neuberger in 
Akai.118 It is suggested that the real issue is the extent to which common 
law notions should influence equitable reasoning. This is how best to 
understand the following remarks of Justice La Forest in Canson: 
I  have no doubt that policies underlying concepts like remoteness and 
mitigation might have developed from an equitable perspective. However, 
given the paucity of authority in the field, it is scarcely surprising that courts 
will deal with a case falling properly within the ambit of equity as if it were a 
common law matter or as justifying the use of its mode of analysis.119
As has already been noted, Canson was a case concerning breach of 
fiduciary duty not breach of trust. But given the use of Canson and other 
cases which did not concern trusts in both Target and AIB, some of the 
comments made regarding breach of fiduciary duty may be exploited 
when determining the principles of compensation that apply in the trust 
context.120 Indeed, in Swindle v Harrison121 (“Swindle”), Lord Justice 
Mummery thought that “fiduciary duties are equitable extensions 
of trustee duties” and similar principles might apply.122 If so, this is 
something of a departure from what was said by La Forest J in Canson: 
[w]e have been given no case where the principles applicable to trusts have been 
applied to a breach of a fiduciary duty of the type in question here, and for 
reasons already given, I see no reason why they should be transposed here. The 
harshness of the result is reason alone, but apart from this, I do not think that 
the claim for the harm resulting from the actions of third parties can fairly be 
looked upon as falling within what is encompassed in restoration for the harm 
115. Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL).
116. See e.g. AIB, supra note 1 at para 136.
117. Canson, supra note 7, per La Forest J (“[w]here concurrent liability lies 
in tort and contract and in equity, the appellants may sue in whatever 
manner they find most advantageous” at 565); see Central Trust Co v 
Rafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147 at 206; Bartlett Nos 1 and 2, supra note 61 at 
95-96.
118. Akai, supra note 6 at paras 130, 131.
119. Canson, supra note 7 at 580.
120. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 63; Penner, supra note 60.
121. [1997] 4 All ER 705 (CA) [Swindle] 
122. Ibid at 723.
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suffered from the breach.123 
The departure may be justified by no longer seeking to “restore” the trust 
fund through an action in equitable debt, but rather awarding compensation 
for all breaches of trust. Concurrent liability at common law and equity 
has often arisen in the context of fiduciaries. In the leading case of Nocton 
v Lord Ashburton124 (“Nocton”), Lord Chancellor Viscount Haldane 
examined the historical development of an action brought by a client 
against his solicitor for negligence in breach of a duty to be skilful and 
careful. After the development of the action of assumpsit, the Lord 
Chancellor thought “it probable that a demurrer for want of equity 
would always have lain to a bill which did no more than seek to enforce 
a claim for damages for negligence against a solicitor”.125 However, it is 
important to appreciate the limits of such comments. They only concern 
breach of a duty of skill and care. They do not extend to breaches of 
loyalty which are peculiarly fiduciary.126
Shortly before his judgment in Target, Lord Browne-Wilkinson had 
already expressed the view that where the claimant sought a remedy for 
professional negligence, the law ought to arrive at the same conclusion 
regardless of whether the claim was brought for breach of contract, tort, 
or an equitable duty of care.127 The historical roots of the duties of care 
apparently made little difference to the compensatory remedies available.
However, some care should be exercised before wholeheartedly 
adopting such an approach to concurrent claims. As Lord Justice Evans 
pointed out in Swindle, claims in equity might be seen to differ from 
those in tort128 because the aim in equity — traditionally, at least — is 
not to put the parties into the position they would have been in had 
no wrong occurred. Rather, in equity, the concern is to restore the 
claimant to the position he was in before the defendant committed the 
123. Canson, supra note 7 at 580.
124. [1914] AC 932 (HL) [Nocton]. 
125. Ibid at 956.
126. Mothew, supra note 10. 
127. See e.g. Target, supra note 2 at 205. See also Somer J in Day v Mead, 
[1987] 2 NZLR 443 (CA) at 458.
128. See e.g. Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880), 5 App Cas 25 (HL).
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wrong. The different approach might be justified by the need to offer 
stronger protection to a beneficiary who was vulnerable under a trust and 
not inclined towards self-seeking behaviour.129 As McLachlin J put it, 
“[i]n short, equity is concerned, not only to compensate the plaintiff, but to 
enforce the trust which is at its heart”.130
It is suggested that there are good reasons why equitable rules might 
differ from those at common law.131 In Canson, McLachlin J went on to 
say:
Cooter and Freedman[132] go on to point out that because the fiduciary has 
superior information concerning his or her acts, it will be difficult to detect and 
prove breach of these wide obligations; and because the fiduciary has control 
based on the notion of implicit trust, there is a substantial potential for gain 
through such wrongdoing. This may justify more stringent remedies than for 
negligence or breach of contract. As Lord Dunedin put it in Nocton … at p. 
963: “there was a jurisdiction in equity to keep persons in a fiduciary capacity 
up to their duty.133
The stricter approach in equity might extend not only to stripping 
wrongdoing trustees of their gains, but also to a stricter approach 
to compensation for loss. The key question to consider is the nature 
of any particular obligation owed.134 As Lord Reed said in AIB, “[t]o 
the extent that the same underlying principles apply, the rules should 
be consistent”.135 This echoes the comments of McLachlin J in Canson: 
“[i]n so far as the same goals are shared by tort and breach of fiduciary duty, 
remedies may coincide.  But they may also differ”.136 After all, equitable 
remedies are qualified in character in ways which are not paralleled in the 
common law. For instance, equitable remedies are always “discretionary” 
129. Canson, supra note 7 at 543, per McLachlin J; Vercoe v Rutland Fund 
Management Ltd, [2010] EWHC 424 (Ch) at para 343, per Sales J.
130. Canson, supra note 7 at 543.
131. AIB, supra note 1 at para 137, per Lord Reed.
132. Robert Cooter & Bradley Freedman, “The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences” (1991) 66 New York 
University Law Review 1045.
133. Canson, supra note 7 at 543.
134. AIB, supra note 1 at paras 92-93, per Lord Reed.
135. Ibid at para 138. 
136. Canson, supra note 7 at 545.
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and may be withheld on the basis of delay or laches, so there exists a system 
of checks and balances within the equitable system which is absent at 
common law. As Gummow has pointed out:
[a]ny effort to import common law concepts must be considered against this 
background and with an awareness that the common law has developed with 
an appreciation that in a court of law we cannot impose terms on the party 
suing; if he be entitled to a verdict, the law must take its course.137 
Indeed, in AIB, Lord Reed observed that “the liability of a trustee for 
breach of trust, even where the trust arises in the context of a commercial 
transaction which is otherwise regulated by contract, is not generally the 
same as a liability in damages for tort or breach of contract”.138 The rules 
of equitable compensation deserve distinct consideration.
V. Quantifying the Loss
A. Scope of Duty
The result in AIB might be explained on a “scope of duty” basis: the fall 
in the property market and probable over-valuation of the property were 
outside the scope of the solicitors’ duty to the bank. This parallels the 
development of the “scope of duty” requirement in tort.139 Indeed, in 
Nationwide Building Society v Balmer Radmore140 (“Balmer Radmore”), 
Mr Justice Blackburne referred to a need to have regard to the “scope of 
the duty which was broken” when considering equitable compensation 
for breach of fiduciary duty.141 
Use of a “scope of duty” analysis strengthens the link between 
equitable compensation and compensation at common law. However, 
the concept of “scope of duty” has proven to be very difficult at common 
137. William Gummow, “Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” in 
Timothy Youdan, ed, Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 
1989) 75, citing Deeks v Strutt (1794), 5 Term Rep 690 (KB (Eng)) at 
693.
138. AIB, supra note 1 at para 136. See also paras 84-85.
139. South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd, 
[1997] AC 191 (HL) [SAAMCO].
140. [1999] PNLR 606 (Ch (Eng)) [Balmer Radmore].  
141. Ibid at 671.
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law.142 It is a malleable concept, and judges are able to mould the scope 
of duty analysis as they see fit.143 Although it now appears often to be 
considered as an element of the remoteness enquiry,144 this is dubious: 
whereas the amount of damages is often capped at a foreseeable level by 
the rules of remoteness, the scope of duty analysis is only able to include 
or exclude types of loss in a binary fashion.145 This seems unnecessarily 
rigid in the context of breaches of trust and fiduciary duty. Thus in Caffrey 
v Darby146 the Master of the Rolls thought that any other approach:
would be an encouragement to bad motives; and it may be impossible to detect 
undue motives. If we get the length of neglect in not recovering this money 
by taking possession of the property, will they be relieved from that by the 
circumstance, that the loss has ultimately happened by something, that is not 
a direct and immediate consequence of their negligence: viz. the decision of a 
doubtful question of law? Even supposing, they are right in saying, this was a 
very doubtful question, and they could not look to the possibility of its being 
so decided, yet, if they have been already guilty of negligence, they must be 
responsible for any loss in any way to that property: for whatever may be the 
immediate cause, the property would not have been in a situation to sustain 
that loss, if it had not been for their negligence. If they had taken possession of 
the property, it would not have been in his possession. If the loss had happened 
by fire, lightning, or any other accident, that would not be an excuse for them, 
if guilty of previous negligence. That was their fault.147
This tough approach might conceivably still be defended in the equitable 
sphere given the flexibility of the court to excuse the trustee from personal 
142. Edwin Peel, “SAAMCO Revisited” in Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel, 
eds, Commercial Remedies: Current Issues and Problems (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 55; Jane Stapleton, “Negligent Valuers and Falls in 
the Property Market” (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 1.
143. See e.g. Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Limited v Johnson & Higgins 
Limited, [2001] UKHL 51.
144. Cf. Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc [The Achilleas], [2008] 
UKHL 48 [The Achilleas]; see Andrew Burrows, “Lord Hoffmann 
and Remoteness in Contract” in Paul Davies & Justine Pila, eds, The 
Jurisprudence of Lord Hoffmann (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015). 
145. Mark Stiggelbout, “Contractual Remoteness, ‘Scope of Duty’ and 
Intention” (2012) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 97.
146. (1801), 6 Ves Jr 488 (Ch (Eng)). 
147. Ibid at 495-96.
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liability under section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925148 (“Trustee Act”). But 
it seems unlikely that such a strict approach is consistent with the tenor 
of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIB. However, this does not 
mean that all the problems with scope of duty should be assimilated into 
equitable compensation: it is an unnecessary complication. Appropriate 
outcomes could be reached by instead relying on principles of causation 
and remoteness.149 Where the breach of duty is deliberate there is less 
reason to restrict the scope of duty at common law,150 and the higher 
standards generally demanded of trustees might suggest that this should 
be mirrored in equity.
B. Cost of Cure
An interesting question arises about whether the principles of equitable 
compensation require the trustee to compensate the trust fund (or 
possibly beneficiary) for the diminution in value suffered as a result of the 
breach of duty or for the cost of cure in repairing the breach of duty. In 
Brudenell-Bruce v Moore & Cotton151 (“Brudnell-Bruce”), Justice Newey 
held that the answer to this question should reflect that given at common 
law. Brudenell-Bruce concerned the estate of the Earl of Cardigan. Lord 
Cardigan is the beneficiary of a bare trust administered by professional 
trustees. Lord Cardigan claimed that the trustees failed to maintain the 
Stable Block of Tottenham House, the seat of the Cardigan family. On the 
facts, the judge rejected the claim that the trustees had acted in breach of 
trust, but nevertheless went on to consider what the appropriate remedy 
would have been had there been a breach of trust. 
The beneficiary argued that the full cost of repair should be awarded, 
contending that even if “it is going to cost £5 million to restore the Stable 
Block but fully restored it is only going to be worth £4 million, that 
is just the price that the trustees pay for allowing this collapse to have 
occurred in the first place”.152 Newey J rejected that argument. The judge 
148. Trustee Act, 1925 (UK), 15 & 16 Geo V c 19, s 61.
149. Cf. Stapleton, supra note 142; Burrows, supra note 144. 
150. SAAMCO, supra note 139 at 214.
151. [2014] EWHC 3679 (Ch) [Brudenell-Bruce].
152. Ibid at para 147.
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could “see no reason why the Courts should be more willing to award 
compensation based on cost of reinstatement in circumstances such as 
those in the present case than they would be to measure damages in that 
way for breach of contract or a tort”.153 Newey J relied upon common 
law decisions such as Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth154 
and In Southampton Container Terminals Ltd v Schiffahrtsgesellschaft 
“Hansa Australia” GmbH155 (The “Maersk Colombo”) to conclude that the 
full cost of cure measure should not be awarded where that would be 
unreasonable.
Equitable awards should not be unreasonable. But it is not obvious 
that this is an area where equity should “follow the law”. The restrictions 
on the full cost of cure remedy in English law are controversial. For 
example, they have not been followed in Australia.156 If what the claimant 
really wants is performance of the bargain or transaction, why should the 
courts not protect that performance interest?157 This question might be 
thought to be particularly difficult to answer in the context of breach of 
trust. After all, it is important that equity hold trustees up to their primary 
obligations to perform the trust properly, which would suggest that the 
cost of reinstatement be the prima facie remedy available. Yet Newey J 
only thought that this “may be the case where equitable compensation is 
awarded as a substitute for performance of a trustee’s obligation to deliver 
up trust assets in specie”.158
Newey J relied upon AIB to justify his approach:
[i]n AIB, Lord Reed explained that equitable compensation for breach of 
trust “aims to provide the pecuniary equivalent of performance of the trust” 
(paragraph 93) and that the measure of compensation for a breach of trust 
“will generally be based upon the diminution in the value of the fund caused 
by the trustee’s default” (paragraph 94). The present case is, in my view, plainly 
one where, had a relevant breach of trust been established, it would have been 
153. Ibid at para 152.
154. [1996] AC 344 (HL).
155. [2001] EWCA Civ 717.
156. Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd, [2009] HCA 8.
157. See generally James Edelman, “Money Awards for the Cost of 
Performance” (2010) 4 Journal of Equity 122.
158. Brudenell-Bruce, supra note 151 at para 151.
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appropriate to measure compensation by the resulting ‘diminution in the value 
of the fund,’ not by the cost of reinstating the Stable Block.159
It is not clear whether AIB fully supports such restrictions on the cost of 
cure remedy. Equitable compensation will generally be the diminution in 
value, because this will generally also equate the cost of cure remedy. But 
where the two measures differ — as in, for example, Ruxley and Brudenell-
Bruce — then a choice has to be made, and Lord Reed’s insistence on “the 
pecuniary equivalent of performance” might favour a cost of cure award. 
It is suggested that the cost of cure remedy has been unduly restricted at 
common law, and that equity should not be bound to follow suit.160 
C. Presumption of Cheapest Means of Performance
At common law, it seems that when assessing the value of chances — and 
indeed of compensation generally — it should be borne in mind that 
the court should assess damages on the basis that the contract-breaker 
performed in a manner most advantageous to himself.161 This is a sensible 
rule. It accords with the need for the defendant to protect its own position. 
Nevertheless, in Durham Tees Valley Airport v BMI Baby,162 the Court of 
Appeal held that, where the defendant has a wide discretion about how 
to perform its obligations, the court should ascertain how the defendant 
would, in fact, have performed. That may have been a pragmatic decision 
on the facts of the case, given the difficulties involved in determining 
the minimum performance required (about operating flights from an 
airport), but it is suggested that the decision should be treated with some 
caution; the established rule that the defendant perform in the manner 
most advantageous to himself should be maintained at common law.
At common law, the defendant owes no duty to the claimant to look 
after the latter’s interests. The same is not true in equity. There is therefore 
no room for a similar presumption to apply in equity. Indeed, the contrary 
presumption seems more appropriate; there should be a “presumption 
159. Ibid at 155.
160. See Elder’s Trustee and Executor Co v Higgins (1963), 113 CLR 426 (HCA) 
at 473 [Elder’s].
161. Lavarack v Woods of Colchester Ltd, [1967] 1 QB 278 (CA (Eng)).
162. [2010] EWCA Civ 485.
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that trust funds will be put to the most profitable use”,163 and the burden 
should shift to the trustee to prove that that is not the case.164 At the 
very least, the court should have regard to what a reasonable, prudent 
trustee would have managed to obtain for the trust fund, rather than the 
very minimum which would have been achieved without there being a 
breach.165
D. Date of Assessment
The date of assessment of loss at common law is a matter of some 
controversy. Orthodoxy suggests that damages are assessed at the date 
of breach. This has the advantage of providing commercial certainty 
and allows the victim of the wrong to assess its losses immediately upon 
breach in order to determine what steps it should take to mitigate its 
loss and whether or not to settle and compromise its claim against 
the defendant.166 This has recently been challenged,167 but, in any 
event, the position in equity is clear and different from the traditional 
understanding of the common law. In equity, compensation is assessed 
at the date of judgment, not breach.168 The breach of duty does not “stop 
the clock”;169 since the trustee must continue to act as a good trustee 
unless and until he is removed from office. The trustee is unable simply 
to breach his trust obligations and then walk away from his duties upon 
compensating the trust fund or beneficiary. It may be that at the date of 
breach no losses occurred, yet substantial losses have arisen by the date of 
judgment.170 A “breach-date rule” would be inapt in such circumstances. 
163. Canson, supra note 7 at 545, per McLachlin J; see also Heydon, supra 
note 4 at 23-260, 23-330.
164. Mulligan, supra note 10 at 508. 
165. Nestle, supra note 10 at 1280, per Staughton LJ.
166. See e.g. Golden Strait Corp v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha, [2007] 
UKHL 12 at paras 10, 11, per Lord Bingham.
167. Andrew Dyson & Adam Kramer, “There is No Breach Date Rule: 
Mitigation, Difference in Value and Date of Assessment” (2014) 130 Law 
Quarterly Review 259.
168. Target, supra note 2 at 437; AIB, supra note 1 at para 140, per Lord Reed.
169. Target, supra note 2 at 437.
170. Cf. Youyang, supra note 69.
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However, the general rule that losses are assessed at the date of judgment 
need not be rigidly applied. In some situations it may be appropriate 
to demand that the trustee pay compensation assessed on the basis of 
the highest intermediate value of the property which was improperly 
sold, for example.171 This is justified because of the continuing duties 
owed by trustees, and flexible approach that equity should be prepared to 
adopt. 
E. Causation
On a traditional approach, as has been seen above, causation was 
irrelevant to claims of falsification. Thus Justice Edelman has said that 
“when payment was sought following an account in common form there 
was a direct analogy with an order for specific performance or payment 
of a liquidated debt which was due. In each case it is no answer for the 
defendant to allege that the plaintiff had suffered no loss”.172 This helps to 
explain why the appeal was allowed in Youyang. The Court of Appeal had 
held that the beneficiary’s claim should fail since “the acceptance of the 
defective deposit certificate was a breach of trust which nevertheless did 
not cause any loss of Youyang’s funds”.173 The High Court of Australia, 
on the other hand, insisted that it was “not to the point”174 that the 
conduct of third parties would have caused the loss anyway “because the 
loss of the trust funds occurred as soon as the trustee wrongly disbursed 
them”.175
Although it has also been suggested that a strict approach to causation 
should be adopted in the context of equitable compensation for breach of 
171. Libertarian, supra note 47 at para 171, per Lord Millett; see generally 
Glister, supra note 106 at 529-34. See also Elder’s, supra note 160 at 473.
172. Jackson (No 2), supra note 18 at para 337.
173. Youyang, supra note 69 at para 29.
174. Ibid at para 63.
175. Ibid.
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fiduciary duty,176 it has since become clear177 that there is no “equitable 
by-pass” of the need to prove a causal link.178 The same now appears to be 
true in the context of all claims for breach of trust. As Lord Reed pointed 
out in AIB:
since the concept of loss necessarily involves the concept of causation, and that 
concept in turn inevitably involves a consideration of the necessary connection 
between the breach of duty and a postulated consequence (and therefore of 
such questions as whether a consequence flows ‘directly’ from the breach of 
duty, and whether loss should be attributed to the conduct of third parties, 
or to the conduct of the person to whom the duty was owed), there are some 
structural similarities between the assessment of equitable compensation and 
the assessment of common law damages.179
Indeed, Lord Toulson thought that a remedy that did not reflect the loss 
caused (or gain caused) by a breach of duty would be penal. It is therefore 
necessary to be clear about what causal link is required. In both Canson180 
and Target,181 reference was made to some sort of “common sense” test of 
causation; yet, as Lord Reed commented in AIB, “[d]ifficult questions of 
causation do not however always have an intuitively obvious answer”.182 
In some areas, equity has favoured rather claimant-friendly approaches. 
For instance, in the context of account of profits for breach of fiduciary 
duty, only “some reasonable connection” between the gain and the breach 
is required;183 and a misrepresentation only needs to be one reason, but 
not necessarily a “but-for” reason, for the claimant’s entering into the 
176. Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co, [1934] 3 DLR 465 (PC 
(Canada)).
177. At least in England and Wales: for comparative discussion see Jamie 
Glister, “Equitable Compensation” in Jamie Glister & Pauline Ridge, eds, 
Fault Lines in Equity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012).
178. Swindle, supra note 121; see also Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v 
Koshy (No 3), [2003] EWCA Civ 1048 at para 147.
179. AIB, supra note 1 at para 136.
180. Canson, supra note 7 at 163, per McLachlin J.
181. Target, supra note 2 at 439, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
182. AIB, supra note 1 at para 95.
183. CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet, [2001] 2 BCLC 704 (Ch (Eng)) at para 97, 
per Lawrence Collins J.
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contract to ground a claim for rescission.184 Nevertheless, AIB appears 
to demand the familiar “but-for” test,185 and this seems sensible when 
focusing on a trustee’s responsibility for loss.186 It is clearly insufficient 
that the wrongdoing trustee simply provided an opportunity for the loss 
to occur; the trustee must cause the loss.187 However, as in AIB, this may 
lead to different outcomes than the traditional approach. Ho has given 
the example of a trustee who wrongfully disposes of a seaside bungalow 
shortly before a tsunami would have destroyed it in any event.188 
Traditionally, a beneficiary would still be able to falsify the wrongful 
misapplication of trust property. Yet it is difficult to see how the wrongful 
act of the trustee causes the beneficiary’s loss, when that loss would have 
been suffered in any event.189
In Libertarian, Ribeiro PJ held that: 
[w]here the plaintiff provides evidence of loss flowing from the relevant breach 
of duty, the onus lies on a defaulting fiduciary to disprove the apparent causal 
connection between the breach of duty and the loss (or particular aspects of the 
loss) apparently flowing therefrom.190
184. See e.g. Attwood v Small, [1838] 6 Cl & F 232 (HL); Reynell v Spyre 
(1852), 1 De G M & G 660 (Ch (Eng)) at 708, per Cranworth LJ.
185. See e.g. AIB, supra note 1 at paras 73, 132, per Lord Toulson & Lord 
Reed. See also Target, supra note 2 at 431 (this is perhaps what Lord 
Justice Patten meant when he spoke of “a proper causal connection 
between the breach and eventual loss” in the Court of Appeal in AIB 
Group (UK) v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors, [2013] EWCA Civ 45 at para 
47).
186. Cf. John Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure, 3d 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at 5-38; Ken Handley, “Causation in 
Misrepresentation” (2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 275. 
187. Swindle, supra 121 at 727, per Hobhouse LJ.
188. Ho, supra note 8 at 217.
189. Ibid, Ho recognises that this result might not be desirable, and suggests 
that “the court will need to adjust the causal test to deal with multiple 
sufficient causes such as these”. It is not clear how this should be done, 
and given the complexities of causation at common law it is unlikely that 
causation in equity will prove to be simple.
190. Libertanan, supra note 47 at para 93. See too Stevens v Premium Real 
Estate Ltd, [2009] NZSC 15 at para 85 [Stevens].
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Given the control over the trust property that the trustee enjoys, and 
the consequent difficulties that a beneficiary faces when seeking to 
establish and prove a breach of duty, it seems entirely appropriate to put 
the onus on the trustee to disprove an apparent causal connection.191 
However, it will not be sufficient for a trustee to show that if he had not 
committed a breach of trust the same loss would have been caused by 
some other third party’s dishonest conduct.192 Moreover, it is difficult to 
see much scope for the principle of novus actus interveniens in the context 
of equitable compensation, since rarely will anything happen to trust 
property which is truly independent of a breach of the duty to safeguard 
it. For instance, imagine that one trustee carelessly allows trust property 
to come exclusively under the control of another trustee. 193 The latter 
then misappropriates the trust assets. The first trustee, who only breached 
a duty of care, is nonetheless liable for all losses suffered, even though the 
immediate cause of the loss is the latter trustee’s misappropriation of the 
trust assets. 
F. Remoteness
Compensation requires some rules of remoteness. Whilst issues of 
remoteness are irrelevant to actions for an agreed upon sum,194 equitable 
compensation must establish principles of remoteness. If the “the 
relentless contractualisation of trust law”195 continues apace, and the 
principles of equitable compensation mirror the contractual principles,196 
then cases such as Hadley v Baxendale197 and C.f. Transfield Shipping Inc 
v Mercator Shipping Inc198 might be thought to be relevant in equity. 
But that is surely misguided. The point of the contractual rules is that 
191. See also Re Brogden (1888), 38 Ch D 546 (CA)(Eng)) at 567-68, 572-73.
192. AIB, supra note 1 at para 58, per Lord Toulson. Cf. Youyang, supra note 69 
at 23-170.
193. Heydon, supra note 4 at [23-340].
194. Re Dawson, supra note 11 at 215, per Street J.
195. Getzler, supra note 76 at 257.
196. Ibid.
197. (1854), 9 Exch 341 (Eng).
198. The Achilleas, supra note 144.
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there exists an agreement between the parties and when making that 
agreement each party could bring the risk of certain losses to the other 
party’s attention. Yet in the trust context, the beneficiary may not always 
have a contract with the trustee. Additionally, the trustee at the time of 
the dispute may not be the same person that originally agreed to the 
terms of the trust instrument. In most commercial trusts, admittedly, 
there will be a concurrent contractual claim, but that contractual claim 
should stand apart. It may be that the contractual claim should trump 
the equitable claim, but the equitable claim — and certainly any free-
standing equitable claim — should not adopt the contractual principles 
of remoteness. Under the contractual approach, foreseeability is assessed 
at the date of entering into the contract.199 But given the higher standard 
expected of trustees, and the different situations that can evolve over 
the course of a trust relationship, it is surely more appropriate for any 
foreseeability requirement to be assessed at the date of breach.
If an analogy is to be drawn to the common law, it would be more 
sensible to look across to tort law. There is a split between the “reasonable 
foreseeability” approach of Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd v Morts Dock 
and Engineering Co. Ltd200 (The Wagon Mound) in the tort of negligence 
and the “direct” approach201 adopted in the context of the intentional 
torts, such as deceit.202 It would be possible for equity similarly to adopt 
different approaches depending on whether or not the breach of duty 
was deliberate, and this differentiation may be evolving in the context 
of breach of fiduciary duty.203 Given the higher standards demanded in 
equity, there is a strong argument for a stricter approach to be taken for 
all breaches of equitable duty.204 As McLachlin J commented in Canson:
199. See e.g. Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland, [2005] UKHL 3.
200. [1961] AC 388 (PC (Austl)).
201. Re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co Ltd, [1921] 3 KB 560 (CA (Eng)).
202. Smith New Court, supra note 109.
203. See the differing judgments in Swindle, supra note 121. For a common 
law analogy in the tort of conversion, see Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi 
Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5), [2002] UKHL 19 at paras 100-104, per Lord 
Nicholls.
204. Cf. Steven Elliott, “Remoteness Criteria in Equity” (2002) 65:4 Modern 
Law Review 588.
105(2016) 2(1) CJCCL
[i]n negligence, we wish to protect reasonable freedom of action of the 
defendant, and the reasonableness of his or her action may be judged by what 
consequences can be foreseen. In the case of a breach of fiduciary duty, as in 
deceit, we do not have to look to the consequences to judge the reasonableness 
of the actions. A breach of fiduciary duty is a wrong in itself, regardless of 
whether a loss can be foreseen.  Moreover the high duty assumed and the 
difficulty of detecting such breaches makes it fair and practical to adopt a 
measure of compensation calculated to ensure that fiduciaries are kept ‘up to 
their duty’.205
This passage was cited with approval in Libertarian,206 and surely applies 
equally to breach of trust. Indeed, Canson was a case where the claim 
failed because the losses suffered were too remote from the breach of 
fiduciary duty on any test.207
In AIB, Lord Reed said that “the foreseeability of loss is generally 
irrelevant, but the loss must be caused by the breach of trust, in the sense 
that it must flow directly from it”.208 It is suggested that foreseeability 
of loss should be irrelevant in the context of the misapplication of trust 
property.209 The risk of unforeseeable consequential loss should be visited 
upon the wrongdoing fiduciary rather than the vulnerable beneficiary.210 
Perhaps foreseeability may be relevant where a duty to take reasonable 
care has been breached such that — in traditional language — the 
205. Canson, supra note 7 at 553. See also Stevens, supra note 191 paras 24, 34, 
per Elias CJ.
206. Libertarian, supra note 47 at para 80.
207. Canson, supra note 7 at 590, per Stevenson J.
208. AIB, supra note 1 at para 135.
209. Clough v Bond, (1838), 3 My & C 490 (Ch (Eng)) at 496, per Cottenham 
LC; Re Dawson, supra note 11 at 215, per Street J; Canson, supra note 
7 at 555-56, per McLachlin J; Target, supra note 2 at 438-39, per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson; Bank of New Zealand, supra note 59 at 687, per 
Tipping J.
210. Cf. Smith New Court, supra note 109.
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account could be surcharged,211 and this may explain the qualification of 
“generally” in Lord Reed’s statement. This depends upon how the nature 
of the trustee’s obligation is explained. If it is akin to a duty to take 
care in tort, then foreseeability should be relevant. If a higher standard 
is demanded of the trustee as a fiduciary, then foreseeability should not 
limit the recoverable losses.
G. Mitigation
Mitigation is a general principle that might reduce the amount of 
compensation a claimant can recover. It even applies in the context of 
deceit. As Lord Steyn commented in Smith New Court: “[t]he third 
limiting principle is the duty to mitigate. The plaintiff is not entitled to 
damages in respect of loss which he could reasonably have avoided. This 
limiting principle has no special features in the context of deceit”.212 The 
victim of a wrong must not act in an unreasonable manner which would 
exacerbate his losses.
A common justification for mitigation is that it helps to avoid waste 
and promote efficient outcomes. Concerns of efficiency may be more 
important in the context of contracts than trusts. This might explain 
why McLachlin J said in Canson that “[t]he plaintiff will not be required 
to mitigate, as the term is used in law, but losses resulting from clearly 
unreasonable behaviour on the part of the plaintiff will be adjudged to 
flow from that behaviour, and not from the breach”.213 However, the 
HVVHQFHRIWKLVGLI¿FXOWSDVVDJe is essentially to introduce a requirement 
211. See e.g. Mothew, supra note 10 at para 17, per Millett LJ; Libertarian, 
supra note 47; cf. Youyang, supra note 69 at para 39. See further Darryn 
Jensen, “Compensation for Breach of Trust — the Remoteness Impasse” 
in Charles Rickett, ed, Justifying Private Law Remedies (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008); Joshua Getzler, “Am I My Beneficiary’s Keeper? Fusion 
and Loss-Based Fiduciary Remedies” in Simone Degeling & James 
Edelman, eds, Equity in Commercial Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2005); 
John Heydon, “Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care 
and Skill Fiduciary?” in Simone Degeling & James Edelman, eds, Equity 
in Commercial Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2005).
212. Smith New Court, supra note 109 at 285.
213. Canson, supra note 7 at 554.
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that the beneficiary acted reasonably after learning of the breach of trust, 
which seems tantamount to mitigation.214 This view gains some support 
from Lord Reed in AIB,215 and is consistent with the majority view in 
Canson.216 Once the beneficiary knows of the breach of trust, he should 
take reasonable steps to minimise his loss.
H. Contributory Negligence
The role of contributory negligence in equity is unclear.217 This issue has 
mainly been discussed in the context of breach of fiduciary duty. Different 
jurisdictions have adopted different approaches. In Day v Mead,218 the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal reduced the amount a principal could 
recover because he was partly the author of his own loss. Sir Robin Cooke 
thought this was the “obviously just course, especially now that law and 
equity have mingled or are interacting”.219 This approach to “fusion” 
is controversial. Other courts have not been so willing to recognise 
the influence of the common law in this area. For example, in Pilmer 
v Duke Group Ltd,220 the High Court of Australia cited with approval 
the comments of McLachlin J in Norberg v Wynrib221 which recognised 
the “conceptual and functional uniqueness” of fiduciary obligations, 
particularly since “one party exercises power on behalf of another and 
pledges himself or herself to act in the best interests of the other”.222 
The High Court further noted, “the severe conceptual difficulties 
in the path of acceptance of notions of contributory negligence as 
applicable to diminish awards of equitable compensation for breach of 
214. Smith, supra note 56 at 368.
215. AIB, supra note 1 at para 135.
216. Canson, supra note 7 at 581, LaForest J; Derk Davies, “Equitable 
Compensation: Causation, Foreseeability and Remoteness” in Donovan 
Waters, ed, Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1993) 317.
217. See generally Balmer Radmore, supra note 140 at 672-77, per Blackburne J 
and the academic commentary cited at 676.
218. [1987] 2 NZLR 443 (CA) [Day].
219. Ibid at 451.
220. [2001] HCA 31 [Pilmer].
221. [1992] 2 SCR 226 at 272.
222. Pilmer, supra note 220 at para 71.
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fiduciary duty”223 and that “the attempt to push common law notions 
of contributory negligence, as now modified by statute, into equitable 
remedies collapses in the face of insurmountable obstacles”.224
In England and Wales, one obstacle is the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945225 (“1945 Act”). That makes no provision for the 
operation of a defence of contributory negligence in the context of 
equitable claims. If the statute is to operate at all in this area, it could only 
be on the same basis as Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher 226 (“Vesta”) 
applies to claims in breach of contract, such that where an equitable duty 
of care overlaps with a tortious duty of care, then in those circumstances 
only might contributory negligence be a defence. This would be a very 
limited category of case and may mean that a trustee would be in a better 
position if able to establish a breach of a tortious duty of care as well a 
(potentially strict) duty imposed by the trust.227
It is suggested that the 1945 Act does not provide any basis for a 
defence of contributory negligence in equity. Nor does section 61 of 
the Trustee Act, concerning the power of the court to relieve trustees 
from personal liability for breach of trust,228 encompass contributory 
negligence. At first instance in Markandan & Uddin,229 Roger Wyand 
QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, noted that there was nothing 
in Vesta which indicated that contributory negligence should be extended 
to instances of breach of trust.230 The judge then went on to state that 
section 61 of the Trustee Act “could have provided for the conduct of 
223. Ibid at para 86, per McHugh, Gummow, Hayne & Callinan JJ.
224. Ibid at para 174, per Kirby J.
225. (UK), 8 & 9 Geo VI, c 28.
226. [1989] AC 852 (HL) [Vesta].
227. A similar oddity arises in the contractual context, since a defendant who 
breaches a strict contractual duty is actually better off (since the defence of 
contributory negligence applies) if he can establish that he also breached 
a tortious duty of care. Yet the innocent party will seek to avoid showing 
that the defendant acted negligently, in order to escape the ambit of 
contributory negligence. 
228.  See Part X below.
229. [2010] EWHC 2517 (Ch) [Markandan].
230. Vesta, supra note 226.
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the beneficiary to be taken into account as the Defendant here wishes. 
It did not and it is not for the Court to extend the law in a way that was 
not done by the legislature”.231 The judge’s conclusions on contributory 
negligence were not pursued on appeal,232 and should be supported: the 
focus of section 61 is firmly placed on the trustee who has committed the 
breach of trust, not the beneficiary. Similarly, section 62 of the Trustee 
Act, concerning the power of the court to make the beneficiary indemnify 
the trustee for breach of trust, only applies if the beneficiary instigated or 
consented to the breach of trust, which does not cover the same ground 
as contributory negligence.
If contributory negligence is truly to be accepted in equity, then this 
is perhaps best explained on the basis that equity seeks a just result, and 
“he who seeks equity should do equity”. It may be that insisting that a 
beneficiary is entitled to trust his trustee absolutely, without accepting 
any responsibility to safeguard his own position at all, is too harsh an 
approach in some instances (particularly in the commercial sphere). 
This may explain Lord Reed’s comment that “losses resulting from 
unreasonable behaviour on the part of the claimant will be adjudged to 
flow from that behaviour and not from the breach”.233 This appears to 
present trustees with an opportunity to raise arguments on contributory 
negligence. Where a breach of trust is concerned, it could perhaps be 
expected that such arguments will find favour. After all, “the line between 
failure to take due care and mitigation could in some instances become a 
fine one and mitigation is certainly a defence in fiduciary law”.234
However, this approach may not be universally popular. Indeed, 
Fleming has described contributory negligence as “an adventure of the 
common law which represents one of its outstanding failures”235 and 
the unsatisfactory nature of the defence led Gummow to argue that it 
should not be recognised in equity: “[a]ll this suggests the unwisdom [of 
entangling the already complex law as to fiduciary duties with notions 
231. Markandan, supra note 229 at para 42.
232. Markandan & Uddin, [2012] EWCA Civ 65 at para 7.
233. AIB, supra note 1 at para 135.
234. Davies, supra note 216 at 317.
235. Law of Torts 2d (Sydney: Law Book, 1961) 214.
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of contributory negligence”.236 In England and Wales, it appears that 
contributory negligence is not a defence to claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty. The headnote to Balmer Radmore states that “no such reduction 
could be made where a breach of fiduciary duty was shown. Breach of 
fiduciary duty was not covered by the provisions of the 1945 Act”.237 
However, this is perhaps slightly misleading. The ratio of the decision of 
Blackburne J is restricted to the rejection of contributory negligence in 
instances of “conscious disloyalty”.238 Blackburne J reasoned that even 
at common law, contributory negligence is no defence to an intentional 
tort, and in equity, it was equally important “to keep persons in a fiduciary 
capacity up to their duty”.239 But it is not yet entirely clear whether the same 
approach would be taken where the fiduciary committed a breach of duty 
negligently rather than deliberately. The need to hold such parties up to a 
higher standard might suggest that no defence of contributory negligence 
should be available.
In any event, even if contributory negligence were to be recognised 
in the equitable sphere, it will be very difficult to satisfy the court that 
the defence has been made out. As Justice Somers commented in Day v 
Mead:
[o]f course, before reducing an award on the ground that the claimant has 
been partly the author of his or her own loss, the Court will have to give much 
weight to the well-established principle that, largely for exemplary purposes, 
high standards are expected of fiduciaries. A strong case is needed to relieve the 
fiduciary of complete responsibility.240
VI. Section 61 of The Trustee Act 1925
The fact that liability for breach of trust is strict makes it likely that claims 
for breach of trust will continue to prove attractive to claimants. Unlike 
common law claims for breach of a contractual or tortious duty of care, 
the claimant beneficiary does not need to prove that the trustee acted 
236. Gummow, supra note 137 at 86.
237. Balmer Radmore, supra note 140 at 610.
238. Ibid at 676-77.
239. Ibid at 677, citing Nocton, supra note 124 at 963, per Lord Dunedin.
240. Day, supra note 218 at 452.
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negligently in failing to comply with the terms of the trust instrument.241 
Instead, the onus is clearly placed on the trustee to prove that he or 
she acted reasonably. This is obviously advantageous to the beneficiary, 
and it seems appropriate. After all, the trustee undertakes to act in the 
best interests of the beneficiary, and “[t]he beneficiary may not be in a 
position to know all that occurred in the chain of events leading to the 
breach of trust”.242 In some instances, holding the trustee liable when 
he or she acted wholly reasonably may be too harsh; this may explain 
the existence of section 61 of the Trustee Act. There is no counterpart of 
section 61 at common law.
Section 61 provides the courts with a statutory discretion to relieve 
trustees from personal liability for breach of trust where the trustee “has 
acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the 
breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in 
the matter in which he committed such breach”. Although, in AIB, Lord 
Toulson thought that section 61 might be used as a “deus ex machina”,243 
it is suggested that relief under section 61 is guided by recognised 
principles.244 In any event, the burden is clearly placed on the trustee to 
prove that he or she acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to 
be excused for the breach of trust.245 This equitable approach has further 
advantages over common law claims if the beneficiary wishes to sue third 
parties to the breach of trust. This is because section 61 is personal to the 
trustee: it excuses the liability of the trustee, but does not mean that there 
241. Santander UK v RA Legal Solicitors, [2014] EWCA Civ 183, per Briggs 
LJ (“[i]t is precisely because of the strictness of the solicitor’s trust liability 
that lenders which are the victims of such fraud prefer to base their 
claims for recovery upon breach of trust rather than breach of contract or 
negligence, because both of those causes of action generally require the 
lender to prove that the solicitor has been guilty of a breach of a duty of 
care” at para 19) [Santander].
242. Ibid at para 111, per Count Etherton.
243. AIB, supra note 1 at para 69, per Lord Toulson.
244. See Paul Davies, “Section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925: deus ex machina?” 
(2015) 6:5 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 379-94.
245. Santander, supra note 241 at para 55, per Briggs LJ.
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has been no breach of trust.246 Thus a third party might still be liable 
for dishonestly assisting that breach of trust, or for knowingly receiving 
property in breach of trust. For example, in Re Smith,247 the trustee was 
a widow who lived in the country and employed a firm of solicitors to 
act as her agents. The solicitor’s clerk fraudulently obtained the trustee’s 
signature on certain cheques and induced her to initial alterations to the 
cheques. He then absconded with the money. The trustee was held to 
have committed a breach of trust, but her liability was excused. If the 
clerk had been sued as an accessory to the breach of trust, the morally 
innocent quality of the trustee’s breach of trust should clearly not afford 
him a defence.
VII. Conclusion
At the very start of his judgment in AIB, Lord Toulson said that “140 
years after the Judicature Act 1873, the stitching together of equity and 
the common law continues to cause problems at the seams”.248 Even 
though the Judicature Act 1873 was only concerned with the fusion of 
the administration of common law and equity, rather than the fusion of 
the substantive rules of each jurisdiction, there is now a need to analyse 
further the principles underpinning equitable compensation. As Lord 
Reed observed:
a trust imposes different obligations from a contractual or tortious 
relationship”249 but “[t]o the extent that the same underlying principles 
apply, the rules [of compensation] should be consistent. To the extent that 
the underlying principles are different, the rules should be understandably 
different.250 
Clarity surrounding equitable compensation is required, both where 
equitable claims exist alongside common law claims and where the only 
246. As section 61 itself says, “the court may relieve [the trustee] either wholly 
or partly from personal liability”. Cf. Perrins v Bellamy, [1899] 1 Ch 797 
(CA (Eng)) at 80, per Lindley MR.
247. (1902), 86 LT 401 (Ch (Eng)). Cf. Re Stuart, [1897] 2 Ch 583 (Eng) at 
590.
248. AIB, supra note 1 at para 1.
249. Ibid at para 137.
250. Ibid at para 138.
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claim available is for breach of trust. The need to hold trustees up to a 
high standard suggests that a strict approach to causation and remoteness, 
for example, will generally be appropriate, especially given the difficulties 
beneficiaries face in discovering breaches of trust.251 
251. See e.g. Santander, supra note 241 at para 112, per Count Etherton. 
